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PLIVA, INC. V. MENSING AFTERMATH:
INFORMED CONSENT LAWSUITS A
POTENTIAL SOLUTION FOR SOME
GENERIC DRUG CONSUMERS INJURED
BY INADEQUATE WARNING LABELING
Deena K. Herndon-Remy ∗

T

he Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing
left generic drug consumers without a cause of action for injuries resulting from generic manufacturers’ inadequate warning
labeling. 1 The Court held that federal law preempts the state-law
failure-to-warn claims. 2 The Court, while recognizing that this
ruling creates an undesirable result for generic drug consumers, is
waiting for the FDA or Congress to resolve the issue. 3 This issue,
however, may not be resolved in the near future. 4 Perhaps informed consent lawsuits can provide relief to some of these injured generic drug consumers. The viability of these lawsuits will
depend on the jurisdiction in which the consumer is able to file
suit.
This issue affects most drug consumers in the United
States because “75 percent of all prescription drugs dispensed in
this country” are generic drugs.5 Additionally, this issue arises
from a typical daily scenario: a patient visits his or her physician,
the physician writes a prescription for a drug, and the patient fills
his or her prescription at a pharmacy. Although the consumer’s
transaction with the physician or pharmacist may seem insignificant to the consumer, the transaction can prove to be costly be∗

J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The University of Houston Law Center.
See generally PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
2
Id. at 2581. (A state-law failure-to-warn claim is based in
tort law and alleges that a manufacturer has failed to provide an adequate
warning label for a product); Id. at 2572.
3
Id. at 2582.
4
See generally id. at 2582 (Part III specifically discusses this issue).
5
Id. at 2583.
1
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cause the consumer may have waived his or her right to sue and
to receive compensation if injured from inadequate warning labeling.
Currently, no one informs generic drug consumers that
they are waiving their right to sue and ability to receive compensation if injured by inadequate warning labeling on generic
drugs. Meanwhile, physicians and pharmacists receive financial
incentives to prescribe and dispense generic drugs.6 Since “the
consumer is unlikely to realize the legal consequences of purchasing generic drugs,” 7 perhaps those who prescribe, dispense, and
pay for the drugs—physicians, pharmacists, and medical insurance companies—can be held responsible. The most viable lawsuits are likely those 1) against physicians in jurisdictions where
the physician’s duty is measured by the patient’s viewpoint; or 2)
against pharmacists who are able to choose whether a prescription is filled by a brand-name or generic drug.
This paper discusses the Mensing case; the issue that
Mensing’s ruling has created for generic drug consumers, and the
viability of informed consent lawsuits against physicians, pharmacists, and medical insurance companies to provide compensation to an injured generic drug consumer who lost his or her right
to sue and to receive compensation under state-law failure-towarn claims.

I. PLIVA, INC. V. MENSING
A. Facts: Consumers Injured by Generic Drug Use
Mensing involved two consolidated state lawsuits against
generic drug manufacturers for a failure to warn consumers. 8 The
generic drug manufacturers in these cases were not brand-name
manufacturers producing generic drugs. 9 In both cases, the plaintiffs received generic metoclopramide from their pharmacists. 10
Physicians typically prescribe metoclopramide to treat digestive
U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., ASPE Issue Brief: Expanding
the
Use
of
Generic
Drugs
7-8,
2010,
available
at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/genericdrugs/ib.pdf; Vanessa Fuhrmans,
Doctors Paid to Prescribe Generic Drugs, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan.
24,
2008,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120114138064112219.
7
8 Okla. Prac., Product Liability Law § 6:7 (2012 ed.).
8
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
9
See id. at 2589.
10
Id. at 2573.
6
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tract problems; 11 however, long-term use can result in tardive
dyskinesia, a severe neurological disorder.12
The plaintiffs in both cases took the generic medicine for
several years and developed tardive dyskinesia. 13 Both plaintiffs
sued the generic drug manufacturers for inadequate labeling because, although the labels warned of the risk of acquiring tardive
dyskinesia, evidence proved that the risk was a far greater percentage than that listed on the label. 14 The Court of Appeals for
both cases held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted,
even though the manufacturers argued the impossibility for them
to simultaneously comply with both the federal and state law requirements. 15
B. Majority Opinion: State-Law Failure-to-Warn Claims
Preempted
The Court’s majority in Mensing 16 held that the federal
law preempted state-law claims for inadequate labeling by generic drug manufacturers because it was impossible for the manufacturers to simultaneously comply with both state and federal labeling requirements. 17 In both cases, the state law duties required
drug manufacturers to label their products in a way that enabled
them to be used in a reasonably safe way when the manufacturer
was aware, or should have been aware, of a product’s risks of
danger. 18 Under federal law, labeling requirements are different
for brand-name and generic drug manufacturers. 19 The HatchWaxman Amendments, also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, allow generic
drugs to be developed less expensively than brand-name drugs.
Generic drugs can be marketed without performing significant
research and development when it is shown that it is equivalent
Id. at 2572.
Id.
13
Id. at 2573.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Section III-B-2 of the opinion is not discussed because it did not receive
majority acceptance and is not precedential.
17
See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2577-78, 2581. Preemption is a constitutional
law principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that the federal law can
supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation. Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
18
Id. at 2573.
19
Id. at 2574.
11
12
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to the brand-name drug. 20 This equivalence includes ensuring
that the generic drug’s warning labeling exactly matches the
brand-name drug’s labeling.21
The parties in Mensing disagreed over the generic drug
manufacturers’ duties under the FDA’s regulations. 22 The generic
drug manufacturers argued that it was impossible for them to
comply with the state-law requirements of changing their labels
when the FDA regulations required their labels to match the
brand-name manufacturers’ labels.23 The plaintiffs argued that
the generic drug manufacturers had options available to them,
including the FDA’s changes-being-effective (CBE) process 24 and
“Dear Doctor” letters 25 that would have allowed them to comply
with both the federal and state requirements. 26
The FDA argued that the generic drug manufacturer
could not change its label under the CBE process to comply with
state law because the label would have been unilaterally changed,
and thus violating federal regulations requiring generic labels to
be identical to the brand-name labels. 27 Also, the FDA interpreted
Dear Doctor letters as labeling that would have been inconsistent
with the drug’s approved brand-name labeling. 28 The Court gave
deference to the FDA’s interpretation of its own rules and, thus,
agreed with the generic drug manufacturers’ argument. 29
Id. (Summarizing the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301–99f.); Greater Access to Generic Drugs: New FDA Initiatives to Improve the Drug Review Process and Reduce Legal Loopholes,
FDA
(Mar.
14,
2013,
2:30
PM),
available
at
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143545.htm.; See also
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FDA (Mar. 14, 2013,
2:32
PM),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevel
opedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGeneri
cs/ (explaining the abbreviated application process for generic drugs created by
the Hatch-Waxman Act).
21
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574.
22
Id.
23
See id. at 2586.
24
Id. at 2575. The CBE process allows manufacturers to, among other
things, strengthen its warnings without the FDA’s prior approval. Id. at 2575
(quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2006)).
25
See id. at 2576.
26
Id. at 2574.
27
Id. at 2575.
28
Id. at 2576.
29
The Court determined that “the FDA’s views are ‘controlling unless
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or there is any other
20
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The Court held that when a party cannot satisfy its state
duties without the federal government’s permission or assistance,
in this case the FDA, the party cannot independently satisfy those
state duties. 30 The Court reasoned that accepting the plaintiffs’
argument would make conflict preemption meaningless. 31 The
Court stated that federal law is the “Supreme Law of the Land,”
even without an express statement by Congress. 32 The Court further reasoned that even if the generic drug manufacturers had requested help from the FDA, they would not have fulfilled the
state requirements because “it demanded a safer label; it did not
instruct the [m]anufacturers to communicate with the FDA about
the possibility of a safer label.” 33 The Court opined that asking
the FDA for help “is not a state-law concern.” 34 The Court stated
its interpretation of the test used in Levine: “[t]he question for
‘impossibility’ is whether the private party could independently
do under federal law what state law requires of it.” 35 In Levine, decided in 2009, the Court held that state-law failure-to-warn claims
against a drug manufacturer were not preempted by federal law. 36
The Court then discussed how Levine is not contrary to its decision because Wyeth is a brand-name drug manufacturer and this
case involved generic drug manufacturers. 37
The Court concluded that by acknowledging “the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt [these plaintiffs] and others similarly situated,” 38 “Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change the law and regulations if they so
desire.” 39

reason to doubt that they reflect the FDA’s fair and considered judgment.” Id.
at 2575 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
30
Id. at 2581.
31
See id. at 2578.
32
Id. at 2579. “The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal law ‘shall
be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’” Id. at 2577 (quoting U.S. CONST.,
art. VI, cl. 2).
33
Id. at 2578.
34
Id. at 2581.
35
Id. at 2578 (emphasis added). See also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
36
Levine, 555 U.S. at 581, 1204.
37
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 2582.
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C. Dissenting Opinion: Injured Generic Drug Consumers Unable
to Obtain Compensation; Generic Drug Manufacturers Should
Not Have Complete Immunity From Failure-to-Warn
Lawsuits
The dissenting opinion rejected the conclusion that generic
drug manufacturers are categorically immune from failure-towarn lawsuits under state tort law. Instead, the dissent believed
that generic drug manufacturers should not be immune when the
manufacturer did not even attempt to comply with state law
through available mechanisms.40 The dissenters highlighted the
importance of Congress’ intent and the assumption that “the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” 41 The dissenters reasoned that “the states have traditionally regulated health and safety matters,” 42 and “Congress has
not expressly preempted state-law tort actions against prescription drug manufacturers, whether brand-name or generic.” 43
The dissenters further argued that preemption is an affirmative defense, which demands that the defendant prove impossibility. 44 The dissenters reasoned that the generic drug manufacturers did not meet their burden of proving impossibility
because the mere possibility of impossibility is not enough. 45 The
generic drug manufacturers “only [proved] that they might have
been unable to comply with both federal law and their state law
duties to warn.” 46
The dissent also argued that Mensing was not distinguishable from Levine because Mensing involved a generic manufacturer rather than a brand-name manufacturer. Rather, Mensing
was similar to Levine because both cases involved manufacturers
that had options available for them to attempt to comply with
state law. 47 “As in [Levine], [the dissenters] would require the
[m]anufacturers to show that the FDA would not have approved
a proposed label change.” 48
The dissenters also argued that the majority invented a
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 2589.
Id.at 2586 (citing Levine, 555 U.S. at 565).
Levine, 555 U.S. at 485.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2586.
Id. at 2587.
Id. at 2581, 2587.
Id. at 2582.
Id. at 2588.
Id.
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new preemption rule not based on existing precedent. 49 “[Levine]
did not hold that unilateral action is a necessary condition in every case.” 50
The dissenters predicted that the “majority’s preemption
analysis [would strip] generic drug consumers of compensation
when they are injured by inadequate warnings.” 51 The dissenters
also predicted that by preempting state tort suits, drug manufacturers would no longer be incentivized to uncover unknown drug
hazards and disclose safety risks promptly. 52
The dissenters further argued that the majority’s “decision
[undid] the core principle of the Hatch Waxman’s Amendments”
of sameness between brand-name and generic drugs.53 They believed that drawing a distinction between these could result in
reduced consumer demand, ethical dilemmas for physicians, and
less support from states for generic drug use. 54 The dissenters argued that these consequences would not further the HatchWaxman Amendment’s goal of increasing generic drug consumption. 55

II. WHY THE MAJORITY OPINION GOT IT RIGHT, EVEN
THOUGH IT CREATED AN ISSUE FOR GENERIC DRUG
CONSUMERS
In Mensing, the Court confronted an issue that it did not
have the power to solve. 56 While the dissenters’ arguments are
persuasive, the Court’s decision was right because either Congress or the FDA has proper authority to address this issue. If the
Court would have allowed the plaintiff’s claim against generic
drug manufacturers to move forward, then it would have undermined the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. 57
In 2009, “the [Supreme] Court resolved an unsettled question . . . by holding [in Wyeth v. Levine] that state-law claims for
Id. at 2589.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2590.
51
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592.
52
Id. (quoting Levine 555 U.S. at 579).
53
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2593.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 2581-82.
57
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman
Amendments),
FDA
(Aug.
1,
2013),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm.
49
50
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failure to warn were not preempted by FDA regulations.” 58 Similar to the plaintiffs in Mensing, Levine involved a patient that
had sued a drug manufacturer for inadequate labeling under state
tort law. 59 In Mensing, the court could have interpreted Levine’s
holding to apply to both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers, leaving cases involving state-law claims for failure to
warn predictably preempted. 60 Instead, the Court interpreted the
holding in Levine narrowly. This created an issue for generic
drug consumers because the types of injuries in these cases are no
longer controlled by Levine, and thus, are preempted by federal
law per Mensing. 61
The dissenters in Mensing argued that the majority’s ruling conflicted with the Hatch-Waxman Amendments because it
drew a distinction between brand-name and generic drugs. In
fact, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments already had drawn a distinction, unrelated to the generic drug’s equivalence with the
brand-name drug—generic drug manufacturers can market their
drugs at lower prices than their brand-name competitors because
they do not have the same research and development costs. 62 The
Hatch-Waxman Act, allows generic drug companies to bring
their products to market without repeating the expensive clinical
trials that brand-name manufacturers have already performed. 63
Therefore, the upfront research is more burdensome for a brandname drug versus a generic drug. The Hatch-Waxman requirement of “sameness” only applies to qualities of the drugs themselves: “A generic drug is identical-or bioequivalent-to a brandname drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use.” 64
The ruling in Mensing does not affect the qualities of the drugs
themselves.
The Court’s ruling was not contrary to the HatchWaxman Amendments because its policy goals were not burProduct Liability Law, supra note 7.
Levine, 555 U.S. at 558-62.
60
Product Liability Law, supra note 7.
61
Id.
62
Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 20.
63
Id.
64
Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:05 PM),
www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm (emphasis added). See also, Understanding Generic Drugs, FDA (March 14,2013, 3:07 PM),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/default.htm.
58
59
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dened. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments were intended to balance two important public policy goals. First, Congress wanted to
ensure that brand-name (also known as innovator) drug manufacturers would have meaningful patent protection and a period
of marketing exclusivity to enable them to recoup their investments in the development of valuable new drugs. Second, Congress sought to ensure that, once the statutory patent protection
and marketing exclusivity for these new drugs . . . expired, consumers would benefit from the rapid availability of lower priced
generic versions of innovator drugs.65
Conversely, the dissenting opinion stated that if the majority had held that federal law did not preempt state tort lawsuits
for failure to warn, then it would be contrary to the purpose of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which keep generic drugs at a
low price. The majority’s ruling protects generic drug manufacturers from incurring the costs of lawsuits and passing these costs
to their customers. If these costs were passed to customers, then
this would negatively affect health care costs. It is widely
acknowledged that “[g]eneric drugs play a key role in making
health care more affordable.” 66
The Mensing dissenters’ concern-that generic drug consumers would not have a claim for inadequate warning labelinghas become a reality: “As a result of today’s decision, whether a
consumer harmed by inadequate warnings can obtain relief turns
solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her
prescription with a brand-name or generic drug.” 67 Since the
Court’s ruling, some lower courts have applied its holding broadly, leaving generic drug manufacturers categorically immune
from failure-to-warn lawsuits and denying relief to generic drug
consumers that have been injured due to inadequate warning labels. 68 Because of the harsh result of Mensing’s ruling, some lowDrug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Amendments), supra note 57.
65
See also Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 21; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:33 PM),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm.
66
Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 20.
67
Mensing, 131 U.S. at 2583.
68
See, e.g., Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.
2012); Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., 657 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2011); Frazier v. Mylan
Inc., No. 1:11–CV–03037–MHS, 2012 WL 6641626 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 18, 2012);
In re Accutane Products Liab., MDL 1626, 2012 WL 3194952 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
7, 2012).
65
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er courts have decided to wait for Congress or the FDA to address the issue and have applied the rule more narrowly by refusing to extend Mensing’s holding and reasoning to areas beyond
failure-to-warn claims, including defective design, even when
Mensing’s reasoning is directly on point.69
While the majority’s opinion reached the correct result, an
issue still exists for injured generic drug consumers, they are left
without a remedy until either Congress or the FDA acts to resolve
the issue.

III. IT IS UNCLEAR WHEN THE ISSUE WILL BE
RESOLVED BY CONGRESS OR THE FDA
As the majority in Mensing correctly states, Congress or
the FDA must resolve this issue.70 To date, Congress has attempted to take action, but the FDA has not; therefore, it is unknown when consumers can expect this issue to be resolved.
On April 18, 2012, the Democrats introduced companion
bills in the House and Senate, titled the Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act. 71 This Act could overrule the Supreme Court’s Mensing decision, and allow generic drug manufacturers to update their warning labels independently of the
brand-name drug warning labels.72 However, both of these bills
have stalled. The House referred their bill to a committee, which
subsequently referred the bill to a subcommittee, but the House
has taken no action since April 20, 2012. 73 The Senate also reBartlett v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012). Bartlett
has been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, and the Court is scheduled
to hear arguments on March 19, 2013. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/mutual-pharmaceutical-co-v-bartlett/.
70
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
71
Id.
72
Katie Thomas, Bills Seek to Change Rule on Generic Drug Labels,
N.Y.
TIMES
(April
18,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/health/bills-seek-to-change-rule-ongeneric-drug-label.html?_r=0. See also Press Release, Leahy, Franken, Bingaman, Whitehouse, Brown, Coons, Blumenthal Introduce Bill To Protect Consumers Using Generic Drugs (Apr. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-franken-bingaman-whitehousebrown-coons-blumenthal-introduce-bill-to-protect-consumers-using-genericdrugs.
73
Patient Safety and Drug Labeling Improvement Act, H.R. 4384, 112th
Cong.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr4384ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr4384ih.pdf.73
69
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ferred their bill to a committee, but the Senate has taken no action since April 18, 2012. 74
Some have petitioned the FDA to change their labeling
requirements so that Mensing’s ruling no longer applies.75 The
FDA has stated that it needs more time to make a decision, and
has not taken any action to date. 76 It is unclear whether the FDA
will change its procedures because this may create problems of
accuracy between brand-name and generic drug labels.77 Also,
the FDA believes “generic drugs are important options that allow
greater access to health care for all Americans” and those that are
“approved by [the] FDA have the same high quality, strength,
purity and stability as brand-name drugs.” 78 The FDA supports
initiatives to improve access to generic drugs by continuously attempting to improve and streamline its review process so generic
drugs can reach consumers quickly. 79 Because of its support of
generic drugs, if the FDA does decide to take action, its decisions
likely: (1) will not cause distrust in generic drug consumers and
(2) will ensure that consumers continue to purchase generic drugs.
Because neither Congress nor the FDA has taken any substantial action to resolve the issue created by Mensing, it is likely
that those who have been injured by inadequate labeling will
look for other avenues for relief.

IV. INFORMED CONSENT LAWSUITS COULD PROVIDE
RELIEF TO SOME INJURED GENERIC DRUG
CONSUMERS
A loss of the right to sue for inadequate warnings will likely lead injured consumers to find alternative responsible parties
from whom they can receive compensation. One possibility is
through informed consent lawsuits. Injured consumers in these
cases could attempt to sue physicians, pharmacists, or medical in74
Patient Safety and Drug Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112 Cong.
(2013)
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112s2295is/pdf/BILLS-112s2295is.pdf.
75
Citizen Petition from Public Citizen to FDA (Aug. 29, 2011) available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizen-Petition-8-26.pdf..
76
Thomas, supra note 72. Generic drug manufacturers and the FDA disagree over whether there is a duty for generic drug manufacturers to propose
changes to their warning labels to the FDA if they think the changes are needed. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576–77.
77
See Abbreviated New Drug Application, supra note 20.
78
Understanding Generic Drugs, supra note 64.
79
Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 20.
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surance companies for failing to inform them that consumers lack
the ability to sue generic medication manufacturers. Alternatively, consumers could attempt to sue physicians, pharmacists, or
medical insurance companies for waiving the consumer’s right to
sue. Arguably, these consumers are not receiving enough information to provide true informed consent when they take generic
drugs instead of brand-name drugs. The viability of these lawsuits will likely depend on the jurisdiction in which the consumer
can file suit.
Informed consent refers to the rules of law that guide
health care providers when interacting with patients; informed
consent also promotes a patient’s right to choose medical treatment. 80 Functions of informed consent include avoiding fraud or
duress, fostering rational decision-making by the patient, and involving the public generally in medicine.81 Plaintiffs could potentially argue informed consent is hindered when health care providers do not inform patients of their loss of the right to sue
generic drug manufacturers. To avoid fraud and duress, a patient
should be notified that, “a disclosure of any appropriate alternative might be advantageous.” 82 Thus, when a health care provider
recommends a generic drug to a patient because it costs less than
the brand-name drug, he or she should also disclose that the lower cost comes with another price—loss of the right to sue and to
receive compensation in case of injury by inadequate warning labeling—so that the patient can fairly determine the amount of
risk he or she is willing to take.
In terms of rational decision-making, potential plaintiffs
could argue that patients are not making rational decisions when
choosing to take generic drugs because they are not fully informed of the consequences of their actions. The more information patients receive, the more rational their decisions will
likely be. By not informing patients of the consequences of taking
generic drugs, physicians risk an increase in distrust from the
public, which could fester and result in consumers preferring
brand-name drugs over their cost-efficient generic counterparts.
Under negligence, a plaintiff may recover for lack of informed consent by establishing the elements of: duty, breach, cau-

JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 3 (2d ed. 2001).
81
Alexander Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research
and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 370-71 (1974).
82
Id.
80
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sation, and harm. 83 A duty to inform patients has typically been
placed on health care providers, including physicians,84 surgeons, 85 dentists, 86 and chiropractors. 87 A breach occurs when a
health care provider fails to disclose a risk to a patient for which
he or she has a duty to disclose. Harm occurs when the undisclosed risk transpires and harms the patient, and causation involves proving that the treatment was a proximate cause of the
patient’s injury. A plaintiff’s biggest hurdle in an informed consent case against a health care provider would likely be proving
that the provider had a duty to inform the patient about their
ability to sue generic drug manufacturers. Proving duty would
duty may be difficult because duty is not always measured from
the patient’s standpoint and a duty may not yet exist for some
healthcare providers.
A. Lawsuits Against Physicians
Some jurisdictions measure a physician’s duty from the
physician’s viewpoint, “measuring the duty to disclose by the
standard of the reasonable medical practitioner similarly situated” (also called professional standard). 88 In these jurisdictions, expert testimony would be required to prove the proper standard,89
and because physicians do not typically warn their patients of
their loss of the right to sue by using generic drugs, the informed
consent argument for physicians would likely fail in this type of
jurisdiction.
However, in jurisdictions where the physician’s duty is
measured from the patient’s viewpoint, it is possible to make a
case for lack of informed consent in cases where a patient is inBerg, supra note 80, at 133.
See, e.g., Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund,
813 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 2012) (holding that physician had a duty to inform patient of an alternative, non-invasive treatment).
85
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding
surgeon had a duty to inform patient of one percent chance of paralysis); Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1999) (holding surgeon had a duty
to inform patient even though procedure was non-invasive).
86
See, e.g., Foote v. Rajadhyax, 268 A.D.2d 745 (N.Y. 2000) (showing
that a dentist can be held liable for lack of informed consent).
87
See, e.g., Hannemann v. Boyson, 698 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 2005) (holding
that a chiropractor has the same duty of informed consent as a physician);
Bronneke v. Rutherford, 89 P.3d 40 (Nev. 2004) (holding that a patientoriented standard of informed consent applied to chiropractors).
88
Barry R. Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW 240 (6th ed. 2009).
89
Berg, supra note 80, at 47.
83
84
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jured by a generic drugs’ inadequate labeling. 90 Generally, the
plaintiff will need to prove the following elements: (1) the physician failed to disclose the risk according to the reasonably prudent patient standard; (2) the undisclosed risk occurred and
harmed the patient; (3) a reasonable person in the patient’s position would have rejected the treatment if the risk was known;
and (4) the treatment was a proximate cause of the patient’s injury. 91
There are several advantages to suing a physician in a jurisdiction where the physician’s duty is measured from the patient’s viewpoint. First, the burden of proof is easier to satisfy because a fact finder can determine what a reasonable person
would have found material to make his or her decision without
having any technical expertise. 92 This allows the fact finder to
make his or her own decision without being influenced by a medical expert’s opinion. Second, because the fact finder must make a
determination regarding what a reasonable person would do,
“previous jury verdicts are not binding precedent. In every case,
the jury is required to determine what would have been reasonable disclosure, taking into account all the facts and circumstances
of the particular case.” 93 This allows the patient a more flexible
outcome, rather than being limited to what has been decided in
similar cases. Third, “the patient-oriented standard imposes upon
physicians more substantial obligations than the professional
standard.” 94 The physician’s duty is not protected by agreement
as to what similar physicians would have done, but is from the
perspective of a reasonable patient whose material concerns are
debatable. 95
The seminal case, Canterbury v. Spence, provides persuasive authority in jurisdictions measured from the patient’s viewpoint. 96 According to Canterbury, the physician’s duty is measured by what conduct would have been reasonable under the
circumstances according to the patient’s need to know material
risks.97 “[A] risk is . . . material when a reasonable person, in what
See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.70.050 (West 2012).
Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 800 A.2d 73, 79
(N.J. 2002) (citing Teilhaber v. Greene, 727 A.2d 518 (N.J. App. Div. 1999)).
92
Furrow, supra note 88, at 241 (citing Pederson v. Vahidy, 552 A.2d 419
(Conn. 1989)).
93
Berg, supra note 80, at 49.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
97
Id. at 785-87.
90
91
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the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position,
would be likely to attach significance to the risk . . . in deciding
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.” 98 “There is no
bright line separating the significant from the insignificant.” 99 Potential plaintiffs could be argued that, from a reasonable person’s
standpoint, not having compensation available for an injury resulting from generic drug usage is a material risk because a reasonable person would otherwise not have decided to use the generic drug.
Every state allows physicians to specify that a brandname drug must be dispensed when writing prescriptions.100
Thus, physicians arguably have the control to decide what types
of medications are dispensed to patients. In some states, physicians are forced to choose when writing a prescription whether a
brand-name drug must be dispensed or if substitution is permitted. 101 In these states, it may be difficult for a physician to blame
another, such as a pharmacist, for waiving a patient’s right to sue
when the physician had the power to ensure that a brand-name
drug was dispensed.
According to Canterbury, there are only two exceptions to
the general rule of disclosure: (1) “when the patient is unconscious
or otherwise incapable of consenting and harm from a failure to
treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by the
proposed treatment;” and (2) when “communication of the risk information would present a threat to the patient’s well-being.” 102
In most situations, these exceptions will not apply to cases involving lack of informed consent for generic drugs.
According to Canterbury, causality is determined objectively:
in terms of what a prudent person in the patient’s position would
have decided if suitably informed of all perils bearing significance. If adequate disclosure could reasonably be expected to
have caused that person to decline the treatment because of the
revelation of the kind of risk or danger that resulted in harm,
causation is shown. 103 A plaintiff could argue that a prudent person in the patient’s position would have found the risk of waiving
his or her right to sue and to receive compensation for injuries
Id. at 787.
Id. at 788.
100
ASPE Issue Brief, supra note 6, at 7, 14-19.
101
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §34-23-8(1) (West 2013); MO. REV. STAT
§338.056(1) (West 2012).
102
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788-89.
103
Id. at 790-91.
98
99
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material to his or her decision to receive generic versus brandname drug treatment.
According to Canterbury, when claiming inadequate disclosure of risk information by a physician, the patient has the
burden of proving the essential elements of the cause of action. 104
The burden of going forward with evidence pertaining to a privilege not to disclose, however, rests upon the physician “because
any evidence bearing on the privilege is usually in the hands of
the physician alone.” 105 This is an additional advantage to the
plaintiff because a privilege not to disclose may be difficult to
prove in these cases when based on the patient’s viewpoint.
“Risk is not limited to medical- or health-related risk . . .
since patients exercise choice in the wider context of their perceptions, values, and intentions.” 106 For example, physicians consider
patients’ insurance coverage and other funding options available
to patients when recommending treatment options.107 Courts
could find that “the foreseeable impact of treatment options on
patients’ income and economic circumstances is material to their
choice.” 108 Likewise, courts could also find that an inability to receive compensation for injury is material.
Informed consent is a broad concept: to be sure, questions about
the validity of a patient’s consent to a procedure typically arise
when the patient alleges that the physician failed to disclose medical risks, as in malpractice cases, and not when the patient alleges that the physician had a personal interest . . . The concept of
informed consent, however, is broad enough to encompass the
latter. 109
Canterbury is not the only case in which a court has determined that a non-health related risk was essential for a physician to disclose to obtain adequate informed consent. In Moore,
the court held that a physician’s personal interest, whether reId. at 791.
Id.
106
B.M. Dickens and R.J. Cook, “Dimensions of Informed Consent to
Treatment,” 85 INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS 309, 311 (2004).
107
Id. at 312.
108
Id. at 311.
109
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a patient had a cause of action for lack of informed consent when a
physician did not disclose his personal interest in the patient’s removed bodily
tissue). See also Goldberg v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698 (Md. 2006) (stating that considerations other than risks, benefits, collateral effects, and alternatives may
need to be discussed and resolved for physicians to obtain adequate informed
consent).
104
105

Herndon-Remy2.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

296

4/15/2014 5:36 PM

Vol. 26:2

search or economic, was an important factor for a physician to
disclose to appropriately obtain informed consent. Likewise,
courts have held that a patient’s quality of life and selfconsciousness can be required in certain situations. 110 Cases like
these leave the door open for courts to require additional informed consent disclosures, such as the loss of right to sue and to
receive compensation for injury.
Because informed consent is a broad concept and physicians are sometimes required to take into consideration factors
other than health-related risks, informed consent is a viable cause
of action for patients to bring in jurisdictions where a physician’s
duty is measured from the patient’s standpoint. Additionally,
modern patient-centered informed consent justifies the disclosure
of more information. 111
B. Lawsuits Against Pharmacists
Like physicians, pharmacists can be defined as health care
providers and may be held liable for lack of informed consent. 112
However, it may be difficult to argue that a pharmacist has a duty to warn a consumer regarding a specific prescription written
by a physician due to the possibility of interference in the physician-patient relationship. It may be easier to argue that a pharmacist has a duty to warn when a physician does not specify a
certain medication and the pharmacist dispenses a generic drug
instead of a brand-name drug at his or her discretion.
State laws control pharmacies’ regulations for dispensing
generic drugs, which allows for variation from state to state. 113
Some states require pharmacists to substitute brand-name drugs
with generic drugs, unless the physician specifies that the brandname drug be dispensed. 114 Some of these states also allow the
See Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1999); Mannina v.
Borland, 869 So. 2d 946 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
111
Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent: No Longer Just What the Doctor
Ordered? The “Contributions” of Medical Associations and Courts to A More
Patient Friendly Doctrine, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 17, 69 (2010).
112
See, e.g., McKee v. Am. Home Products, Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1048,
1054 (Wash. 1989); Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15 S.W.3d
804, 809 (Tenn. 2000).
113
ASPE Issue Brief, supra note 6, at 7. See also RICHARD R. ABOOD,
PHARMACY PRACTICE AND THE LAW 147–148 (7th ed. 2012).
114
ASPE Issue Brief, supra note 6 at 7, 14-19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§465.025(2) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §328-92(a), (b) (West 2012);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §217.822(1), (3) (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32,
§13781 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. §15-118(a)(1) (West 2012);
110

Herndon-Remy2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing Aftermath

4/15/2014 5:36 PM

297

consumer to refuse a substituted generic drug and request a
brand-name drug.115 Other states allow, but do not require,
pharmacists to substitute brand-name drugs with generic drugs if
the physician does not specify otherwise. 116 However, some of
these states require the pharmacist to obtain permission from the
consumer prior to substitution. 117
In states where pharmacists are required to substitute generic drugs when possible, an argument for lack of informed consent is likely to fail because pharmacists do not have control over
what drugs they dispense. This is especially true in jurisdictions
where the consumer has the right to refuse substitution and can
control what medication is dispensed. However, in states where
pharmacists have the ability to substitute generic drugs, but are
not required to do so, an argument that the pharmacist has
waived the consumer’s right by choosing to dispense a generic
versus a brand-name drug is stronger. However, this is not the
case in states that require the pharmacist to obtain permission
from consumers to substitute because the consumer is in control
of what drug is dispensed. In these states, while waiver of informed consent is not a viable argument, lack of informed consent could be because the pharmacist recommended substitution
without disclosing the consequences of the consumer’s decision. It
MINN. STAT. §151.21(3) (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. §639.2583(1) (West
2011); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §960.3(a) (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §53-10205(a) (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4605(a) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §30-5-12b(b) (West 2012).
115
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §465.025(2) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§328-92(a) (West 2012); MINN. STAT. §151.21(3) (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT.
§639.2583(1) (West 2011); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §960.3(a) (West 2012); TENN.
CODE ANN. §53-10-205(d) (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4605(a) (West
2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. §30-5-12b(n) (West 2012).
116
ASPE Issue Brief, supra note 6 at 7, 14-19. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§08.80.295(a) (West 2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §32-1963.01(A) (West 2012);
ARK. CODE ANN. §17-92-503(b) (West 2013); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4073
(West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §20-619(b), (c) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN.
§26-4-81(a), (g) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS §333.17755(1), (3) (West 2012);
MISS. CODE ANN. §73-21-117 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. §37-7-505
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §71-5403(1) (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§146-B:2(I), (II) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §26-3-3(C) (West 2012); N.D.
CENT. CODE §19-02.1-14.1(3) (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4729.38(A)
(West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. §689.515(2) (West 2012); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN.
§562.008(b) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §58-17b-605(1) (West 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. §54.1-3408.03(A) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §33-24-148(b)
(West 2012).
117
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §08.80.295(a) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§58-17b-605(1) (West 2012).
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could be argued that when the pharmacist obtains permission
from the consumer to substitute, that it would not take much
more for the pharmacist to warn of the risk of loss of right to sue
and to receive compensation for injury at this time.
However, courts have been hesitant to “interject the
pharmacist into the physician-patient relationship,” believing that
the duty to warn should remain with physicians. 118 Also, there is a
fear that this could negatively affect the relationship between
physicians and pharmacists. 119 However, these courts’ concerns
are typically related only to health care and not to concerns outside of health care, such as the loss of the right to sue and to receive compensation. 120
Because disclosing to consumers that they lose their right
to sue for injury if they take generic drugs is not likely to interfere
with the physician-patient relationship, it could be argued that it
is appropriate to place this duty on the pharmacist, especially
when the pharmacist is the person responsible for dispensing the
drug to the consumer and the physician may not have control
over the actual drug that ultimately reaches his or her patient.
C. Lawsuits Against Medical Insurance Companies
Lawsuits against medical insurance companies would likely be difficult because they have neither previously been held liable for informed consent nor been labeled as a typical health care
provider. Despite these obstacles, an argument could be made
that they should be held liable for lack of informed consent because they have some control over what drugs consumers ultimately purchase and use.
Generic drugs are typically cheaper for consumers than
brand-name drugs because they are placed on the cheapest tiers
of insurance plans, where brand drugs typically are not placed. 121
Medical insurance companies increase the cost of certain drugs by
McKee, 782 P.2d at 1051.
Id. at 1053.
120
See, e.g., Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. 1988) (showing
court concerned with pharmacist disclosing a drug’s side effects to consumer);
Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. App. 1988) (showing court concerned
with pharmacist identifying consumer’s drug addiction); W. KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 96 at 688 (5th ed. 1984).
121
Ernst R. Berndt and Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing and Reimbursement
in U.S. Pharmaceutical Markets, Faculty Research Working Paper Series 10
(2010). See also What Drug Plans Cover, MEDICARE.GOV (Mar. 17, 2013, 7:56
PM), https://www.medicare.gov/part-d/coverage/part-d-coverage.html.
118
119
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placing them in higher tiers in order to incentivize consumers to
not purchase the drugs. 122
When a consumer fills a prescription, does he or she really
have a choice as to what prescription he or she buys? Brandname drug pricing and insurance plans may make this impossible, even when the consumer has a choice. 123 “[I]n many cases,
consumers will have no ability to preserve their state-law right to
recover for injuries caused by inadequate warnings” because, for
economic reasons, they may be forced to purchase generic
drugs.124 It could be argued that because insurance companies
typically set their prices for brand-name drugs higher than generic drugs, consumers are forced to buy the cheaper drugs because
they cannot afford to purchase the more expensive drugs, especially brand-name drugs, without financial help from insurance
companies, which would likely be lacking. “Rising prescription
drug costs remain a major challenge for consumers.” 125 Most likely, this will affect people above the age of 65, because they generally consume more drugs than those under age 65. 126
Also, there are medications that medical insurance companies will not cover under insurance plans, making the costs too
high to purchase them without insurance coverage and forcing
the consumer to purchase alternatives to the drug that are covered. 127 It could be argued that this is a situation where the consumer is forced to purchase cheaper drugs using his or her medical insurance.
Since medical insurance companies’ payment and reimbursement plans often disfavor brand-name drugs, they could potentially be held liable for waiving their insured customers’ right
to sue and to compensation for injuries resulting from generic
drugs’ inadequate warning labeling
Ernst R. Berndt and Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing and Reimbursement
in U.S. Pharmaceutical Markets, Faculty Research Working Paper Series 11
(2010).
123
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592; ASPE Issue Brief, supra note 6, at 11.
124
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2592.
125
Greater Access to Generic Drugs, supra note 20. See also Katie Thomas, Brand-Name Drug Prices Rise Sharply, Report Says, NY TIMES (Nov. 28,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/business/cost-of-brand-nameprescription-medicines-soaring.html?_r=0.
126
Ernst R. Berndt and Joseph P. Newhouse, Pricing and Reimbursement
in U.S. Pharmaceutical Markets, Faculty Research Working Paper Series 36
(2010).
127
Drug Plan Coverage Rules, MEDICARE.GOV (Mar. 17, 2013, 7:56 PM),
https://www.medicare.gov/part-d/coverage/rules/drug-plan-coveragerules.html.
122
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V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Mensing leaves injured generic drug consumers unable to receive compensation from generic drug manufacturers when they are injured by inadequate warning labels.
Congress or the FDA needs to resolve this issue; however, it is
unclear when this will occur. Because consumers are unable to
sue generic drug manufacturers in failure-to-warn lawsuits, those
injured may find relief from lawsuits based on lack of informed
consent against physicians, pharmacists, or medical insurance
companies. The most viable lawsuits are likely those (1) against
physicians in jurisdictions where the physician’s duty is measured by the patient’s viewpoint; and (2) against pharmacists who
are able to choose whether a prescription is filled by a brandname or generic drug.

